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Abstract 
An empirical investigation into the financing of urban 
development in Japan is undertaken. Following a descrip- 
tion of governmental structure, regression and other analy- 
ses are presented based on data for 336 cities and 46 pre- 
fectures for 1960-1970. It is found that attempts to 
achieve vertical financial equity among regions and cities 
is partly achieved, as poor cities and prefectures benefit 
from central government tax and subsidy programs. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In Glickman [1977c], we discussed Japan's regional nlanning 
system and how it attempted to redistribute population and reduce 
interregional income inequalities. We concluded that the plan- 
ing system had little to do with the relative decline in inmigra- 
tion to the large cities which began in the early 1960s. 
Additionally, since the spatial distribution of central govern- 
ment investment was relatively centralized, we argued that public 
spending patterns did little to reduce income differences among 
regions. We further concluded that most of the decentralization 
which took place could be attributed to the normal workings of 
the market-place: firms sought locations where land prices were 
relatively low and where labor was cheap and available; families 
sought housing where jobs were located and where the environment 
was more congenial. This increasingly meant that people and firms 
were locating away from the three main metropolitan centers, 
t primarily in middle-sized regions . We also cited evidence thata 
reduction in interregional income differentials has lowered 
the propensity of families to migrate to the richer urban centers. 
L However, not all of the narrowing differences could be accounted 
for by the decentralization of industry to poorer regions. We 
noted the research of Sakashita [I9761 which indicated that govern- 
ment tax and subsidy programs were responsible for some of the 
I We have discussed these trends in Glickman [1977al and have 
shown that the metropolitan areas which form the Regional Economic 
Clusters (see Glickman [1977a, 1977b1 grew more quickly than non- 
metropolitan areas, principally because of higher birth rates in 
the cities, and that there was evidence of lower levels of inmigra- 
tion to the major metropolitan centers beginning in the late 1960s. 
 or some evidence, see Mera [19761 . 
increased incomes, of both the people and the local yovernrr,ents, 
in poorer regions. 
To better understand the Japanese method of income redistri- 
bution among regions, we analyze the revenue structure of the local 
governments in this essay. The two major questions we ask are: 
(1) What are the revenue sources available to local 
government? 
(2) What determines the amount of local revenue from 
each source? 
The first question leads to a study of the institutional 
framework of the local governnents (hereafter, LG)  and the 
fiscal relations between various governmental levels. The second 
question requires finding socio-economic variables which help 
explain the amount of revenues which come from the various sources. 
There are four additional parts to this Faper. Section 2 
outlines the institutional structure of the Japanese government 
and the fiscal relations of its several layers. Sections 3 and 4 
are devoted to quantitstive analysis of the revenue structure of 
municipal governments and is the major contribution of this paper. 
Sector 5 briefly discussess the role of prefectural governments 
and Section 6 presents some conclusions. 
2. THE STRUCTURE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN JAPAN 
2.1 A Brief History of Local Government 
The opposing themes of centralization and decentralization 
figure prominently in the development of local government in Japan. 
Decentralized systems of governance of the feudal era were replac- 
ed with centralized government institutions with the rise of 
m e r c a n t i l i s t  and,  l a t e r ,  i n d u s t r i a l  f o r c e s .  The f le i j i  c o n s t i -  
t u t i o n ,  which symbolized t h e  v i c t o r y  of  t h e  emerging bourgeo i s  
c l a s s  i n  Japan ,  was t h e  f i r s t  movernent towards  c e n t r a l i z a t i o n ;  
on t h i s  s u b j e c t ,  see S t e i n e r  [1965] .  Japan  i s  now p o l i t i c a l l y  
subd iv ided  i n t o  f o r t y - s e v e n  p r e f e c t u r e s  ( i n c l u d i n g  ~ k i n a w a )  
which w e r e  f i r s t  e s t a b l i s h e d  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  M e i j i  r e s t o r a t i o n  and 
t h e  a b o l i t i o n  of  f e u d a l  f i e fdoms  i n  t h e  1870s.  The ~ e i j i  c o n s t i t u -  
t i o n  and t h e  Law Concerning t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  of  Urban and Rura l  
P r e f e c t u r e s  (1890) e s t a b l i s h e d  a  u n i t a r y  sys tem r a t h e r  t h a n  a  
f e d e r a l  t y p e  of  government such a s  t h e  American one .  The governor  
( c h i j i )  o f  each p r e f e c t u r e  was a p p o i n t e d  by t h e  Emperor on recom- 
mendation of  t h e  M i n i s t e r  of  Home A f f a i r s .  The governor  had t h e  
power t o  o v e r r i d e  d e c i s i o n s  o f  t h e  p r e f e c t u r a l  l e g i s l a t u r e ,  
t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  f o r m u l a t e  p r e f e c t u r a l  b u d g e t s ,  and c o n s i d e r a b l e  
c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  budge t s  o f  v i l l a g e s ,  towns ,  and c i t i e s .  
A s  n o t e d  by McNelly [1972] ,  c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  and bureaucracy  
r a t h e r  t h a n  l o c a l  autonomy w e r e  t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  l o c a l  
government i n  prewar Japan .  During t h e  American Occupation p e r i o d ,  
a  d e c e n t r a l i z e d  government sys tem,  which enphas ized  l o c a l  hone r u l e ,  
was superimposed on t h e  h i g h l y  c e n t r a l i z e d  and b u r e a u c r a t i c  r u l i n g  
h e r i t a g e  o f  Japan .  A f t e r  t h e  war,  l o c a l i t i e s  w e r e  g u a r a n t e e d  home 
r u l e  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  new c o n s t i t u t i o n .  However, no p r e c i s e  func-  
t i o n s  and powers a r e  anywhere e n u n c i a t e d  i n  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  s o  
t h a t ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  newly promulgated p r i n c i p l e  o f  l o c a l  
autonomy, t h e  l o c a l  governments w e r e  o n l y  a b l e  t o  e x e r c i s e  powers 
d e l e g a t e d  t o  them by t h e  D i e t ,  a s  had been t h e  c a s e  b e f o r e  t h e  
war,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  S t e i n e r .  
The t h r e e  eche lons  of government i n  Japan a r e  t h e  c e n t r a l  
( n a t i o n a l )  government,  p r e f e c t u r a l  government,  and munic ipal  
government,  Postwar l e g i s l a t i o n  has  encouraged t h e  amalgamation 
of m u n i c i p a l i t i e s ,  and f o r  r e a sons  of  economy and e f f i c i e n c y  mar-y 
3 chose t o  merge. Th i s  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  t r u e  d u r i n g  t h e  1950s . 
2 . 2  Func t i ons  of  Local  Governments 
The major i n s t i t u t i o n a l  f u n c t i o n s  of  l o c a l  governments i n  
Japal? a r e  : ( 1 ) t o  c a r r y  o u t  c e r t a i n  c e n t r a l  government ( h e r e a f t e r ,  
CG 1 l e g i s l a t i o n  and p r o j e c t s  and ( 2 )  t o  e n a c t  and e n f o r c e  t h e  
l e g i s l a t i o n  o f  t h e  LGs themselves .  I n  c a r r y i n g  o u t  t h e  former 
group o f  f u n c t i o n s ,  t h e  LG agenc i e s  a r e  supe rv i s ed  by t h e  r e l e v a n t  
depar tments  o f  t h e  CG, e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  M i n i s t r i e s  of  Home A f f a i r s ,  
F inance ,  Educa t ion ,  and Welfare .  The poxe r s  o f  t h e  l o c a l  govern- 
ments a r e  d e l e g a t e d  by l e g i s l a t i o n  passed  by t h e  D i e t .  According 
t o  t h e  Local  Autonomy Law, t h e  LGs have a u t h o r i t y  concern ing  gen- 
e r a l  p o l i c e  work, s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  and w e l f a r e ,  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  and 
maintenance of urban i n f r a s t r u c t u r e ,  urban p l ann ing ,  e d u c a t i o n ,  
'(TO d a t e ,  t h e  a n a l g a n a t i o n  movement, s o  impor tan t  a t  t h e  muni- 
c i p a l  l e v e l ,  h a s  n o t  r e s u l t e d  i n  t h e  merger of any of  t h e  n r e f e c -  
t u r e s ,  which have t h e  same boundar ies  a s  t hey  had b e f o r e  World War 
11. Much more r a d i c a l  a r e  t h e  p r o p o s a l s  t o  a b o l i s h  t h e  p r e f e c t u r e s  
comple te ly ,  and t o  r e p l a c e  them w i t h  seven t o  n i n e  d i s t r i c t s  o r  
s t a t e s .  A c o n t r o v e r s i a l  m o d i f i c a t i o n  of  t h e  former p r o p o s i t i o n  i s  
t h a t  of i n t e r p o s i n g  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  u n i t s  of  t h e  c e n t r a l  governmeht 
between t h e  p r e s e n t  p r e f e c t u r e s  and t h e  c e n t r a l  government.  Most o f  
such i d e a s  a r e  opposed by p r e f e c t u r a l  gove rno r s ,  who i n s i s t  t h a t  t h e  
r i g h t s  and t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of  t h e  peop le  i n  t h e  p r e f e c t u r e s  must be  
p r e se rved ,  and by t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s ,  who accuse  t h e  L i b e r a l  
Democratic P a r t y  advoca tes  o f  t h e s e  schemes of p l o t t i n y  t o  d e s t r o y  
t h e  p r i n c i p l e  of  l o c a l  autonomy i n  f a v o r  o f  a  c e n t r a l i z e d  regime run 
by t h e  c o n s e r v a t i v e s .  A s  McNelly n o t e s ,  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  S o c i a l i s t s  
t o  win p r e f e c t u r a l  gove rno r sh ip s  and assembly s e a t s  would be  reduced 
by t h e  p r o p o s a l s  f o r  amalgamations of p r e f e c t u r e s .  I 
and l e v y i n g  and c o l l e c t i n g  t a x e s .  The CG may a l s o  d e a l  w i t h  
4 
t h e s e  m a t t e r s  when it wishes  , Governors  o f  p r e f e c t u r e s  and 
mayors o f  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s  a r e  e l e c t e d  by t h e  v o t e r s  o f  t h e i r  
r e s p e c t i v e  u n i t s  f o r  terms o f  f o u r  y e a r s ,  s u b j e c t  t o  r e c a l l  by 
t h e  v o t e r s .  The Local  Autonomy Law p r o v i d e s  t h a t  l o c a l  e x e c u t i v e s  
s h o u l d  c a r r y  o u t  n a t i o n a l  laws  and c a b i n e t  o r d e r s .  N a t i o n a l  de -  
l i b e r a t i v e  o r g a n s  may s u e  a  l o c a l  c h i e f  e x e c u t i v e  f o r  f a i l i n g  t o  
c a r r y  o u t  s p e c i f i e d  n a t i o n a l  laws o r  p r o j e c t s ;  e i g h t y  p e r c e n t  o f  
a l l  work handled  by l o c a l  government u n i t s  c o n s i s t  o f  a d m i n i s t r a -  
t i v e  a f f a i r s  e n t r u s t e d  t o  them by a g e n c i e s  of  t h e  c e n t r a l  govern-  
ment.  Thus,  l o c a l  mayors and governors  must s e r v e  two m a s t e r s  
s i n c e  t h e  f u n c t i o n  a s  a g e n t s  o f  t h e  CG i n  n a t i o n a l  m a t t e r s  and 
o f f i c e r s  o f  t h e i r  l o c a l  governments i n  l o c a l  m a t t e r s .  Under p r e -  
s e n t  l aws ,  70 p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  t a x e s  a r e  c o l l e c t e d  by t h e  CG w i t h  
5 30 p e r c e n t  r e t a i n e d  by t h e  l o c a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s  . However, a b o u t  
60 p e r c e n t  of  t h e  t a x e s  a s s i g n e d  t o  t h e  CG a r e  s u b s e q u e n t l y  r e -  
t u r n e d  t o  t h e  l o c a l  governments  i n  v a r i o u s  ways. A s  a  r e s u l t ,  
o n l y  some 30 p e r c e n t  of  a l l  t a x e s  a r e  d i r e c t l y  s p e n t  by t h e  C G ,  
w h i l e  t h e  r e s t  i s  s p e n t  by t h e  l o c a l  governments .  The p r o f e s s e d  
p o l i c y  i s  t o  c o l l e c t  t h e  maximum revenue  from t h e  w e a l t h i e r  l o c a -  
l i t i e s  and t o  r e d i s t r i b u t e  it t o  l o c a l  e n t i t i e s  w i t h  i n s u f f i c i e n t  
f i n a n c i a l  a b i l i t y  r e l a t i v e  t o  need ,  a c c o r d i n a  t o  t h e  M i n i s t r y  of 
Home A f f a i r s  [19721. A s  w e  s h a l l  see, a  l a r g e  p r o p o r t i o n  of  t h e  CG 
d i s b u r s e m e n t s  a r e  problem - o r  p r o j e c t - s p e c i f i c  ( i . e .  e a r m a r k e d ) ,  
l e a v i n g  l i t t l e  i n i t i a t i v e  t o  t h e  LG o v e r  f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c i e s .  
4 ~ h e  o v e r l a p p i n g  o f  f u n c t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  among t h e  t h r e e -  
l e v e l s  o f  t h e  government h i e r a r c h y  concern ing  l o c a l  problems may 
c r e a t e  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  i n e f f i c i e n c y  and may r e n d e r  it q u i t e  d i f f i -  
c u l t  f o r  a  concerned c i t i z e n  t o  p i n p o i n t  where government - re l a t ed  
problems o r i g i n a t e .  The muddle o f  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  makes it e a s y  
t o  p a s s  t h e  buck,  and government ,  even a t  t h e  l o c a l  l e v e l ,  t o o  
o f t e n  seems b u r e a u c r a t i c  and unrespons ive  a c c o r d i n q  t o  many observers. 
5 ~ e e  S t e i n e r  on t h i s  s u b j e c t .  For  o t h e r  t r e a t m e n t s  o f  J a p a n e s e  
l o c a l  government and P O - l i t i c s  s e e  I d e  [ I  9651 , I k e  [I9571 , Mukherjee 
[ 1 9 6 6 ] ,  ~ s u n e i s h i  [I9661 and Ward and Rustow 119641. 
I n  t h e  remainder o f  t h i s  paper ,  we w i l l  c o n c e n t r a t e  on 
a n a lyz ing  t h e  methods of  f i n a n c i n g  urban development through 
t h e  complex sys tem of in te rgovernmenta l  r e l a t i o n s .  F i r s t ,  we 
d e s c r i b e  t h e  v a r i o u s  revenue sou rce s  t o  L G s  ( S e c t i o n s  3.11 t o  
3 . 1 6 ) .  Then we go on t o  look a t  o u r  d a t a  b a s e  ( S e c t i o n  3.21 and 
t o  c a t e g o r i z e  LG revenue sou rce s  ( S e c t i o n  3 . 3 ) .  T h i s  s e c t i o n  
p rov ide s  background f o r  t h e  e m p i r i c a l  a n a l y s i s  of  S e c t i o n  4 ,  where 
w e  5 i g h l i g h t  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e  CG and t h e  L G s .  
3 . 1 . 1  Local  Taxes 
These t a x e s  a r e  l e v i e d  by t h e  m u n i c i p a l i t y  i n  accordance  w i th  
t h e  Local  Tax Law enac t ed  by t h e  D i e t  i n  1950. The same law 
"p rov ide s  t h e  t a x e s  t o  be  l e v i e d  by t h e  l o c a l  p u b l i c  e n t i t i e s  and 
d e s c r i b e s  t h e  b a s i s  of  t a x  computat ion and methods of  c o l l e c t i o n  I 
o f  r e s p e c t i v e  t a x e s " ;  see M i n i s t r y  of Home A f f a i r s  [1972].  The 
Local  Tax Law p rov ide s  s t a n d a r d  t a x  r a t e s  and assessment  methods. 
However, l o c a l  governments may l evy  t a x e s  a t  r a t e s  h i g h e r  t han  t h e  
s t a n d a r d  ones ,  when t hey  c o n s i d e r  it neces sa ry ,  b u t  n o t  exceeding 
t h e  l i m i t  set f o r t h  by t h e  law. 
There  a r e  two t y p e s  of l o c a l  t a x e s :  ( a )  Ordinary  ( o r  " s t anda rd" )  
t a x e s  such a s  t h e  f l un i c ipa l  I n h a b i t a n t ,  Fixed A s s e t s ,  E l e c t r i c i t y  
and Gas, and t h e  Minera l  Product  Tax; and ( b )  S p e c i a l  Purpose 
t a x e s  such a s  t h e  Spa,  C i t y  P l ann ing ,  Water U t i l i t y  and Land P r o f i t  
Tax. The l a t t e r  l e v i e s  a r e  determined by t h e  l o c a l i t y  accord ing  t o  
i t s  assessment  of i t s  needs .  
3.1.2 Loca l  T r a n s f e r r e d  Taxes 
Thz CG l e v i e s  and c o l l e c t s  t h e s e  t a x e s  on goods r e l a t i n g  t o  
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  and r e l a t e d  consumption.  They a r e  t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  
m u n i c i p a l i t i e s  and p r e f e c t u r e s  on t h e  b a s i s  of  d e c i s i o n s  by t h e  
CG when t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  and r e l a t e d  f a c i l i t i e s  a r e  l o c a t e d  w i t h i n  
t h e  m u n i c i p a l i t y .  The b a s i c  forms o f  such  t a x e s  a r e  Local  Road, 
S p e c i a l  Tonnage, L i q u i f i e d  Pet ro leum Gas, A v i a t i o n  F u e l ,  and 
Motor V e h i c l e  Tonnage Taxes.  
3 .1.3 Local  A l l o c a t i o n  Taxes 
T h i s  i s  t h e  revenue-shar ing  sys tem under which 32 p e r c e n t  o f  
t h e  sum of  t h e  t h r e e  b a s i c  n a t i o n a l  t a x e s  ( C o r p o r a t i o n  Tax, Liquor  
Tax, and Income Tax) i s  c o l l e c t e d  by t h e  CG and t h e n  a l l o c a t e d  t o  
t h e  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s .  The Local  A l l o c a t i o n  Tax i s  d i v i d e d  i n t o  two 
p a r t s ,  o r d i n a r y  and s p e c i a l .  The o r d i n a r y  a l l o c a t i o n  t a x  i s  g i v e n  
by t h e  CG t o  l o c a l  p u b l i c  a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  accordance  w i t h  t h e  c a l c u -  
l a t e d  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  amount o f  s t a n d a r d  f i n a n c i a l  needs  
and t h e  s t a n d a r d  f i n a n c i a l  r evenue  a s  computed by t h e  CG,  th rough  
a  r a t h e r  r i g i d ,  compl ica ted  fnrmula.  D i s t r i b u t i o n  of  t h e  s p e c i a l  
a l l o c a t i o n  t a x  is  d e s i g n a t e d  bv t h e  CG. 
3.1.4 T r e a s u r y  Disbursements  
Such revenues  a r e  earmarked by t h e  CG f o r  s p e c i f i c  purposes  
and programs and a r e  t h e n  a l l o c a t e d  t o  t h e  LGs. There  a r e  t h r e e  
components t o  t h e  t r e a s u r y  d i sbursements :  
( a )  programs i n  which t h e  LGs s h a r e  f i n a n c i a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
w i t h  t h e  CG. I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  t h e  s h a r e  o f  t h e  CG i s  govern-  
e d  by t h e  Local  F inance .  
( b )  expenses  r e i a t e d  t o  p r o j e c t s  f o r  which o n l y  t h e  CG i s  
f i n a n c i a l l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  and e x e c u t i o n  o f  which i s  
e n t r u s t e d  t o  t h e  LG. For  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  e l e c t i o n  o f  D i e t  
members and t h e  c o l l e c t i o n  o f  n a t i o n a l  s t a t i s t i c s  a r e  
i n c l u d e d  i n  t h i s  c a t e g o r y ,  which i s  known a s  
"noney i n  t r u s t " .  
(c )  t r e a s u r y  s u b s i d i e s  and g r a n t s - i n - a i d s  a r e  a l l o c a t e d  by 
t h e  CG (i) t o  s u b s i d i z e  s p e c i a l  f i n a n c i a l  needs  o f  t h e  
LGs c o n c e r n i n g  l o c a l  o r  p u b l i c  c o r p o r a t i o n s  l o c a t e d  i n  
t h e  m u n i c i p a l i t y ,  (ii) t o  encoqrgge  s p e c i a l  p r o j e c t s ,  
u s u a l l y  f o r  s t i m u l a t i n g  economic growth ,  and (iii) a s  
g r a n t s - i n - a i d  f o r  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s  where n a t i o n a l  i n s t i t u -  
t i o n s  3re l o c a t e d .  
3 .1 .5  P r e f e c t u r a l  Disbursements  
T h i s  fund i s  a l l o c a t e d  by t h e  p r e f e c t u r a l  governments  t o  
m u n i c i p a l i t i e s .  T h i s  t y p e  o f  r evenue  h a s  two components:  a )  t h o s e  
funds  t h a t  accompany t r e a s u r y  d i s b u r s e m e n t s  o f  t h e  CG and are e a r -  
marked f o r  s p e c i a l  p r o j e c t s  t o  which t h e  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s  c o n t r i b u t e  
as w e l l ;  and ( b )  t h o s e  t h a t  are a l l o c a t e d  by t h e  p r e f e c t u r e  a l o n e ,  
a g a i n  earmarked by u s e  c a t e g o r y  b u t  f o r  which t h e  p r e f e c t u r a l  
government a l o n e  i s  f i n a n c i a l l y  r e s p o n s i b l e .  
3.1 .6 Loca l  Bonds 
Every f i s c a l  y e a r  LGs se l l  l o c a l  bonds.  However, t h e  c o n t r o l  
o v e r  t h e  t o t a l  v a l u e  o f  t h e  l o c a l  bonds t h a t  can  be  i s s u e d  by a 
LG, and t h e  amount of t h o s e  bonds bought  by t h e  CG, rests w i t h  
t h e  M i n i s t r y  o f  Eone A-£fa i r s .  S i x t y - f i v e  p e r c e n t  o f  a l l  
l o c a l  bonds i s s u e d  e a c h  y e a r  i s  purchased  by CG a g e n c i e s ,  w h i l e  
t h e  rest i s  bought  by p r i v a t e  i n d i v i d u a l s  and v a r i o u s  f i n a n c i a l  
i n s t i t u t i o n s .  Local  bonds a r e  i s s u e d  f o r  f i n a n c i n g  p u b l i c  h o u s i n g ,  
compulsory e d u c a t i o n ,  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  p u b l i c  l a n d ,  p u b l i c  and 
q u a s i - p u b l i c  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  and w e l f a r e  p r o j e c t s .  
Tab le  1 shows t h e  r e l a t i v e  impor tance  of each  revenue i t e m  
t o  l o c a l  government f i n a n c e .  Note t h a t  t h e  l a r g e s t  i t em ,  l o c a l  
t a x e s ,  i s  s t i l l  on ly  3 3  p e r c e n t  of a l l  LG revenues .  The rest  
comes from e i t h e r  t h e  c e n t r a l  government o r  from p r e f e c t u r a l  
governments.  F igu re  1 i n d i c a t e s  t h e  revenue s t r u c t u r e  of  
l o c a l  government. 
3 . 2  The Data Base used i n  t h e  Ana lv s i s  o f  t h e  JaDaneSe Local  
P u b l i c  Finance  System 
W e  have g a t h e r e d  and o rgan i zed  a  d a t a  bank f o r  t h r e e  hundred 
and t h i r t y  s i x  c i t i e s  f o r  1960,  1965 and 1970 which w e  c a l l  t h e  
"C i ty  Data Bank". I t  c o n s i s t s  o f  a  set  o f  d a t a  which a r e  c o n s t a n t  
th rough  t ime ,  such a s  a  c i t y ' s  d i s t a n c e  from Tokyo o r  whether  o r  
n o t  it i s  a  p r e f e c t u r a l  c a p i t a l ;  t h e s e  a r e  i n  F i l e  # l , a s  l i s t e d  
i n  Appendix 1. There  a r e  f o u r  remaining d a t a  f i l e s h a v i n g  over  100 
o t h e r  v a r i a b l e s  f o r  demographic, s o c i a l ,  economic, p o l i t i c a l  and 
governmental ,  dnd environmenta l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  These v a r i a b l e s  
were used i n  t h i s  s t u d y  and i n  Glickman and McEone [ 19771 t o  
supplement t h e  Regional  Data Bank o u t l i n e d  i n  ~ p p e n d i x  2 o f  Glickman 
[1977b].  
3 . 3  I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  Types o f  Revenues 
Our d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  LG revenue s t r u c t u r e  s u g g e s t s  d e c i s i o n -  
p o i n t s  f o r  revenue a l l o c a t i o n s .  Xa t i ona l  and n r e f e c t u r a l  p o l i c i e s  
d i r e c t e d  t o  s p e c i f i c  problems and programs a r e  t h e  f i r s t  c a t ego ry  o f  
d e c i s i o n  p o i n t s .  There  c e r t a i n  funds  a r e  earmarked f o r  use  by t h e  
CG; hence ,  t h e y  a r e  d i c t a t e d  by t h e  C G ' s  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  t h e  l o c a l i t y ' s  
Table 1: Level and Percent Distribution of Revenues for 
Cities, Towns and Villlages, 1970 
(billions of Yen) 
Total Revenue 
Local Taxes 
Transferred Tax for Local Government 
Local Allocation Tax 
Treasury Disbursements 
Prefectural Disbursements 
Local Bonds 
Rents, Fees and changes 
Miscellaneous 
(percent) 
Source: Japan Bureau of Statistics Office of the 
Prime Minister [1973]. 
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Figure  1 :  Revenue S t r u c t u r e  of a Typical  Local ~ o v e r d m e n t  Unit  
PREFECTURAL 
DISBURSEMENTS -b 
needs and the city's relative position in the national economic 
structure. Prefectural disbursements are another type of earmarked 
revenue, reflecting prefectural governmental priorities. For none 
earmarked CG disbursements, the second category, it is claimed by 
the CG that such funds are directed at establishing vertical finan- 
cial equity between the poor and wealthy cities, i.e. reducing 
interregional income disparities. This category includes the local 
allocating tax and local transferred taxes. The third category, 
locally-based revenues, depends on the political and socio-economic 
structure of the city itself in that its components, local taxes 
and local bonds, are determined by the characteristics of the 
locality and the decisions of their administrators, subject to 
dictums of the centralized hierarchic system. 
To see whether the data would support such a grouping of 
revenue sources, and to test this initial set of hypotheses, cor- 
relation matrices for eight revenue items were obtained for three 
different formulations: a) 1970 revenues (in million yen), 
b) percent change in revenues between 1965-1970, and c) percent share 
of the revenue items in total revenue in 1970. By looking at the 
correlation coefficients, we saw that formulation a) had high coef- 
ficients while the other two formulations showed no statistically 
significant relationships. The correlation matrix of a) is given 
in Table 2. 
By using the linkage method of factor analysis we obtained 
the following groupings of the revenue items: 
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where : 
LTX : 
-
LTT : 
TRD : 
Local  t a x e s ,  
Local  T r a n s f e r r e d  Taxes ,  
Local  A l l o c a t e d  t a x e s  ( O r d i n a r y ) ,  
Local  A l l o c a t e d  t a x e s  ( S p e c i a l )  , 
T r e a s u r y  Disbursements ,  
P r e f e c t u r a l  Disbursements  ( w i t h  TRD) , 
P r e f e c t u r a l  Disbursements  o n l y ,  
Local  Bonds. 
The f i g u r e s  g i v e  t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  between t h e  v a r i -  
abbes .  The l i n k a g e  method v e r i f i e s  o u r  s e l e c t i o n  of  a  second 
group,  non-earmarked revenues  ( N E M R ) .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, it shows 
t h a t  t h e  l o c a l  and t h e  earmarked revenues  (EMR) v a r y  t o g e t h e r  t o  
a  c o n s i d e r a b l e  d e g r e e .  P r e f e c t u r a l  d i s b u r s e m e n t s ,  d e s p i t e  i t s  
d i v i s i o n  i n t o  two i t e m s  a s  t h o s e  accompanying EMR and t h o s e  a l l o -  
c a t e d  by t h e  p r e f e c t u r a l  a l o n e ,  show a  p o s i t i v e  c o r r e l a t i o n  w i t h  
t h e  d i r e c t i o n  of v a r i a t i o n  l o c a l  t a x e s .  
Another i n t e r e s t i n g  o b s e r v a t i o n  i s  t h a t  l o c a l  bonds v a r y  p o s i -  
t i v e l y  w i t h  t r e a s u r y  d i sbursements .  R e c a l l  t h a t  6 5  p e r c e n t  of 
l o c a l  bonds i s s u e d  by t h e  LGs a r e  purchased by t h e  CG i n  o r d e r  t o  
f i n a n c e  p u b l i c  c o r p o r a t i o n s  and d e b t .  W e  b e l i e v e  t h a t  l o c a l  bond 
p u r c h a s e s  by t h e  CG a r e  n o t  used a s  a  s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  t r e a s u r y  d i s -  
bursements ,  b u t  a s  a  complement t o  it. Concerning t h e  r e l a t i o n  o f  
t h e  NEMR t o  o t h e r  r evenue  t y p e s ,  w e  see t h a t  NEMR i s  h i g h l y  tor- 
.., 
r e l a t e d  t o  both  t r e a s u r y  d i sbursement  (on t h e  a v e r a g e ,  r = . 7 4 ) ,  
and t o  l o c a l  bonds r 7 7 )  Having made t h e s e  o b s e r v a t i o n s ,  w e  
dec ided  t o  keep o u r  i n i t i a l  revenue g roup ings ,  and proceeded t o  
a n a l y z e  what f a c t o r s  a f f e c t  t h e  amounts of  revenue i n  each  c a t a g o r y .  
2 Even though t h e  R s were h igh ,  t h e  r e s u l t s  of t h e s e  p r e l i -  
minary r e g r e s s i o n s  gave us  l i t t l e  i n s i g h t  i n t o  t h e  ques t ion  of 
how u rban iza t ion  was f inanced ,  due t o  t h e  aggrega te  n a t u r e  of t h e  
a n a l y s i s .  Therefore ,  we decided t o  make a  more d i saggrega ted  
a n a l y s i s .  Since t h e  LDP and i t s  conse rva t ive  power i s  most s i g -  
n i f i c a n t  i n  r u r a l  a r e a s  and s n a l l  towns, whi le  more l i b e r a l  
bodies  tend t o  be e l e c t e d  t o  LGs i n  l a r g e r  l o c a l i t i e s  where 
t h e  econonies a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  more developed,  we decided t o  s tudy 
revenue s t r u c t u r e s  i n  two subgroups of c i t i e s .  One subgroup 
con ta ins  c i t i e s  which a r e  s n a l l  and l e s s  developed i n  terms of 
t h e  secondary s e c t o r  of  t h e  economy; t h e  o t h e r  con ta ins  l a r g e r ,  
more developed urban a r e a s .  We chose two c r i t e r i a  f o r  d i v i d i n g  
t h e  d a t a  s e t :  (1) t h e  mean popula t ion  of Japanese c i t i e s ,  and 
( 2 )  o v e r a l l  mean va lue  added (VA) pe r  worker i n  t h e  manufacturing 
s e c t o r .  We observed t h a t  t h e  s e t  of c i t i e s  w i th  popula t ions  l e s s  
than t h e  n a t i o n a l  average corresponded t o  c i t i e s  wi th  VA/worker 
lower than t h e  n a t i o n a l  average,  and t h e  same r e l a t i o n  e x i s t s  
f o r  t h e  s e t  of l a r g e  and developed c i t i e s .  The correspondence 
between t h e  c i t i e s  d iv ided  according t o  t h e  two c r i t e r i a  was 
9 3 . 4  pe rcen t .  Since t h e  s e t  of l a r g e  c i t i e s  t hus  ob ta ined  c l o s e l y  
corresponds wi th  t h e  c e n t r a l  c i t i e s  of t h e  Regional ~ c o n o m i c  
C l u s t e r s  (REC)  o u t l i n e d  i n  Glicknan [1977b) ,  we d e l i n e a t e d  65 c i t i e s  
a s  " l a r g e "  according t o  t h e  two c r i t e r i a  mentioned above; t h e s e  
65 c i t i e s  a r e  a l l  included i n  t h e  80  RECs .  Therefore ,  t o  ensure  
cons i s t ency  and c o n t i n u i t y  wi th  t h e  r e l a t e d  r e s e a r c h ,  we decided 
t o  adopt  t h e  c e n t r a l  c i t i e s  of t h e  80 RECs a s  t h e  s e t  of " l a r g e  
c i t i e s "  and t h e  r e s t  a s  t h e  s e t  of "smal l  c i t i e s " ,  and t o  pursue 
r e s e a r c h  on two d i f f e r e n t  s e t s  of d a t a .  
We retained the three categories of revenues (local revenues, 
non-earmarked revenues and earmarked revenues) in working with the 
set of small cities because they gave better statistical estima- 
tions than when we worked with more disaggregated categories. 
However, we were able to obtain a more detailed revenue classifica- 
tion for the large cities. First, local revenues are divided 
between local taxes and local bonds, sicce local taxes are determined 
by the characteristics of the locality while local bonds are affect- 
ed prinarily by the purchase plans of the CG. Second, earmarked 
revenues were divided into two components, treasury and prefectural 
disbursements. In this way, we hoped to more clearly trace the 
role of CG in relation to the munici~alities. 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE SYSTEM 
4.1 Introduction 
We undertook a regression analysis of local government 
finance in order to try to explain how local revenues, non-earmarked 
revenues and earmarked revenues are determined within the Japanese 
local public finance system. In Section 4.2 we observe the beha- 
vior of our set of small cities. we then turn our attention to 
the large cities in Section 4.3 where we do a more detailed analy- 
sis, first in a descriptive mode, and then using regressions. 
4.2 Resression Analvsis of the Set of Small Cities 
The best regression estimates were obtained with three 
revenue categories, estimated for two time periods, 1960-1965, 
and 1965-1970. In each time period there are three equations, 
(1) local revenues, comprising local taxes and local bonds, 
bonds, 12) non-earmarked revenues, consisting of local transferred 
taxes and local allocation taxes, and (3) earmarked revenues, which 
are treasury and prefectural disbursements. The dependent variable 
is expressed in millions of - yen at the end of the period, and all 
independent variables that are not expressed in percent change 
terms are calculated for the end of the time period. 
We list and describe the variables used in these regressions in 
Table 3 (thesz variables are also used in the analysis of large cities 
in Section 4.3 below). Table 4 presents the results of the best 
fitting regressions for the two time periods, where each cell con- 
tains the sign and the t-value of the regression coefficient if the 
respective independent variables were significant at the 95 percent 
confidence level. Next, we examine these results. 
4.2.1 Local Revenues 
Local revenues are positively related to socio-economic vari- 
ables showing growth and development; that is, cities with high 
productivity and greater percentage of employment in manufactur- 
ing, a high percent of population at adult age and college gra- I I 
duates, a high index of infrastructure development, and more 
6 population, all show higher local revenue levels . The relation- 
ships seem quite stable over the two time periods. 1 
6 Interestingly enough, the independent variables SALES (whole- 
sale plus retail sales) is negatively related in both periods with 
high levels of confidence, even though its simple correlation to 
local revenues is positive (+0.66). This paradox can best be under- 
stood when the positive correlation between population (POP) and 
wholesale and retail sales (SALES) is considered. Sincefin the first 
period, POP enters the regression equation with a positive sign, the 
positive covariance of SALES with the dependent variables is taken 
care of, and only the negative contribution of SALES remains. A 
similar effect comes from the rather strong positive relation of 
inmigration (INMGR) to local revenues in the second period. In both 
2 time periods, the R s are high, approximately 0.96. 
Table 3: Description of the Independent Variables 
Used in Reqression Analysis 
MFPRD .... Value added per worker in secondary sector. 
SALES .... Total retail and wholesale sales (millions of yen). 
INMGR .... Ratio of daytime to nighttime population. 
DEPR .... Ratio of population to employed persons. 
A POP .... Percent change in population. 
ADULT .... Percent of population between the ages 15-64. 
INFRA .... Index of infrastructure and social overhead capital: 
'in C - where Xi is a vector of In' 
n 'n
infrastructure variables in city i: 
'il - Tatami per household member (one Tatami = meters squared) 
'i2 - telephones per 1 0 0 0  persons 
'i3 - percent of households with water supply 
xi4 - number of books in the libraries 
XiS - number of households living in dwelling units 
and xn is the mean of nth variable for the DO central 
-
cities. 
LDPV . . . . 
COLGE . . . . 
INC . . . . 
REMP . . . . 
SPDIST .. . 
POP . . . . 
CTYAGE . . . 
A TEMP . . . 
A SRVE . . . 
Percent of total votes received by LDP candidates. 
Percent of population with college degrees. 
Average monthly family income. 
Ratio of the employment in mining, fishing, construction 
and secondary sectors to employment in tertiary and 
government sectors. 
Dummy variable, assigning value 1 if the city is part of 
a new industrial city or other development district. 
Total nighttime population of the city. 
Age index of cities, where the year 1868 is equal to 1. 
Percent change in the total employment. 
Percent change in tertiary and government sector employ- 
ment 
A SECE ... Percent change in the secondary sector employment. 
Table 4: Regression Estimates for the Set of Small Cities, 
1960-1965  and 1965-1970 
1365 - 1970 
Earmarked 
Revenues 
0.85 
102 .O 
Earmarked 
Revenues 
0.77 
86.0 
Non-earmarked 
Revenues 
0.40 
12 .O 
1960 - 1965 
Non-earmarked 
Revenues 
0.53 
25.0 
A 
+ 
+ 
+ 
- 
- 
Local 
Revenues 
0.96 
491 .O 
slgn 
- 
+ 
- 
Local 
Revenues 
0.97 
5.98 
- + 
- 
+ 
+ 
REMP 
SPDIST 
POP 
CITYAGE 
ATEM? 
ASERVE 
ASEC 
R 2 
F-value 
sign 
+ 
- 1 
+ 
+ 
+ 
- 
L 
- 
MFPRD 
SALES 
INMGR 
DEPR 
L! POP 
ADULT 
INFRA 
LDPV 
COLGE 
INC . 
- 
+ 
+ 
sign 
+ 
0) 
- 
-4 
- 
- 
+ 
+ 
- 
- 
+ 
- 
+ 
+ 
4.2.2 Non-earmarked Revenues (NEIIR) 
2 
Here we have low R s for botn periods, -NEMR are negatively 
related to the socio-economic variables that were positively re- 
lated to local revenues. In fact, local taxes and non-earmarked 
revenues are negatively correlated within the set of small cities. 
Obviously, in the calculation of the standard financial needs and 
revenues, the CG considers the more populated small cities 
(i.e. 100,000 - 175,000 population group) better able to handle 
their own financial needs. Since many of these cities are New 
Indzstrial Cities (Ministry of Home Affairs [1969]) labor produc- 
tivity is high, resulting in a less skewed income distribution 
with high wages, and thus, a richer local tax base. This reduces 
their need for NEMR. 
4.2.3 Earmarked Revenues (EMR) 
2 This category gives satisfactory R s in both time periods. 
EMR varies directly with NEMR in cities that are more populated, 
having relatively little manufacturing employment, and low rates 
total employment growth; it is also higher in regional centers 
in the less developed regions (Kyushu and Shikoku, for instance), 
with high population and low industrial growth. Also, a positive 
relation of EMR to local revenues occurs in cities in which there 
is a high volume of business activity. 
4 . 2 . 4  Summary of Analysis of Small Cities 
Overall, the behavior of the system of small cities does 
not change significantly over the two time periods as shown by 
stable regression equations. In short, local revenues are higher 
in economically well-established cities with growth potential; 
NEMR due to the manner by which it is calculated by CG, goes to 
cities with low local revenue bases, independent of population size. 
EMR plays an intermediary role between LR and NEMR, in that it 
favors poor, highly populated cities with little growth in less 
developed regions, and also helps further stimulate growth in 
cities that are relatively well-to-do. 
4.3 The Set of Larae Cities: A Descriptive and Rearession 
Analysis of the Geographic Distribution of Local Government 
Revenues 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Our study of the set of large cities is more interesting 
because, at this level of urbanization, we see the agglomeration 
effects and externalities offered by urban areas. Such exter- 
nalities are positive in terms of more vibrant economic develop- 
ment, and negative with respect to congestion and pollution. 
Two levels of analysis are used in this section. First, we 
describe the spatial distribution of LG revenues to the large 
cities and their patterns of change. Second, we try to statistical- 
ly associate the revenues of a LG with factors that summarize its 
relative status in terms of social, economic,and physical aspects. 
4.3.2 Descriptive Analysis of the Financial System 
in large cities 
4.3.2.1 measures for ~escriptive Analysis 
We have constructed five measures used in the descri~tive 
analysis of the spatial distribution of revenues. 
(a) Percent Distribution of Total Revenues to Cities. Here, 
the percent shares of the cities in national totals are given. 
The shares are computed over three points in time (1960, 1965, 
and 1970) for five revenue categories and total revenues of the 
locality; see Gencer and Glickman, [1976; Appendix 111. Table I] 
for detailed data for individual cities. 
(b) Per Capita Revenues. The percent share of cities in 
national total (in (a) above) should be correlated with the size 
of the urban areas. Also, we want to know which areas are being 
stimulated for growth by the CG or where growth can be locally- 
supported. One measure used to discern these effects is per capita 
revenues. Later in this section, measures (a) and (b) are used 
to observe whether larger tax bases also enabled higher per capita 
revenues (i.e., polarization of tax bases in which richer cities 
receive revenues at the expense of poorer cities) or if there is 
an explicit CG intervention towards vertical equity in revenue 
7 
sharing as commonly hypothesized . Per capita revenues are also 
calculated over the three time periods and five revenue items 
plus total revenues; see Gencer and Glickman [~ppendix 111, 
Table I11 for detailed data. 
7 ~ e e  Steiner . 
( c )  P e r c e n t  Change i n  P e r  C a p i t a  Revenue. The p e r c e n t  change  
i n  t h e  f i v e  r e v e n u e  i t e m s  and t o t a l  r e v e n u e s  i s  computed f o r  t h e  
t i m e  p e r i o d s  1960-1965 and 1965-1970. The d i r e c t i o n  and t h e  
magni tude  o f  changes  i n d i c a t e s  whe the r  t h e  sys t em o f  r e v e n u e  
s h a r i n g  i s  moving towards  v e r t i c a l  e q u i t y ,  g rowth  s t i m u l a t i o n  
t h r o u g h  p o l a r i z a t i o r , , o r  some o t h e r  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  Gencer  and 
Glickman, [Appendix 111, T a b l e  1 1 1  g i v e  d e t a i l e d  d a t a  f o r  i n d i -  
v i d u a l  c i t i e s .  
( d )  S h i f t  Index .  T h i s  measure was d e v i s e d  i n  o r d e r  t o  under -  
s t a n d  c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  s h a r e s  o f  c i t i e s  i n  t h e  f i v e  r e v e n u e  i t e m s .  
The i n d e x  i s  computed a s :  
- q k / R I J k  - (Sha re  o f  c i t y  a t  t i m e  ' 0 ' )  
' ' ilk 1 1  (Sha re  o f  c i t y  i a t  t i m e  '1') 
Rik/R.  k  
- 
where 
0 1 
R i k f R . k  = Revenue o f  t y p e  - k ( i n  m i l l i o n s  o f  - yen)  i n  c i t y  - i , 
f o r  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  and end  o f  t h e  t i m e  p e r i o d ,  
r e s p e c t i v e l y ;  
Thus,  i f :  
"ik > 1.: c i t y  - i h a s  d e c r e a s e d  i t s  s h a r e  i n  r e v e n u e  k - 
- 
"ik = 1.: no change  i n  c i t y  i ' s  s h a r e  i n  r e v e n u e  k - - 
"ik < 1.: c i t y  i h a s  i n c r e a s e d  i t s  s h a r e  i n  r e v e n u e  k .  - - 
See Gencer and Glickman [Appendix 111, Table IV] for individual 
calculations of shift indices. 
(e) Share Quotients. The purpose of share quotients is to 
measure whether municipality - i has a relative advantage over 
others in revenue sharing in terms of a specific revenue type, 
say k. In other words, we want to account for the size--i.e., 
population--of the municipality (which affects the magnitude of 
its revenues), as well as the economic importance of that munici- 
pality vis-a-vis the national system, in order to see if the city 
is being favored in terms of a revenue type by the CG. Two pos- 
sible formulation for this are: 
percent share of revenue k in total revenues of city i 
- - 
percent share of revenue k in total national revenue 
- 
percent share of city - i in national total for revenue k 
- 
percent share of city i in national total for total revenues 
- 
These formulations are in fact the two interpretations of the same 
thing and we define share quotients as: 
where each dot represents summation over that subscript; see 
Gencer and Glickman [Appendix 111, Table V] for each city's share 
quotient. 
Share quotients are used with per capita revenues and percent 
share of cities in looking at the geographic distribution, both 
in terms of regional and metropolitan versus non-metropolitan 
cities. Also percent changes in revenues and shift indices will 
help us trace the patterns of change in these distributions. 
4.3.2.2 Descriptive Analysis of the Spatial Distribution 
of Revenues of Large Cities 
The percent share of cities in total revenues are mapped in 
Figure 2 for 1970. As one would expect, large metropolitan 
centers constitute the areas where the total revenues are 
highest. One can also observe that the suburban cities in a 
major metropolitan region or Standard Consolidated Area (the SCA 
is a region of three or more contigious RECs as we have noted in 
8 Glickman [1977bl have percent shares far below the mean share of 
the 80 cities. This contrast between the suburban cities and the 
central cities in a SCA does not significantly change when we speak 
of revenues in per capita terms; this is Shown in Figures 3 and 4.  
With the exception of Tokyo for 1960 and 1970, central cities in 
all SCAs have higher per capita revenues than suburban cities. 
When we look at per capita revenues for non-SCA cities versus 
the cities within the SCAs, we observe that the former have per 
capita revenues near or below the mean per capita revenue of the 
SCA cities (with the exception of the four cities in Hokkaido 
region in our data bank). 
8 
For a definition of the SCAs see Gllckman [1977b; Section 21, 
, - 
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These observations suggest that per capita revenue, an important 
indicator of vertical equity in revenue sharing systems, increases 
from non-SCA cities to SCA cities, and within the SCAs, from 
suburban cities to central cities. 
We also observe the disribution in terms of the contrast 
among the SCAs. Table 5 contains the percent shares of the eight 
SCAs in total revenues. The Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya SCAs taken 
together dominate the others in the northwest and southeast parts 
of Japan with respect to shares of per capita revenues. The Tokyo 
SCA, however, has different characteristics from the rest of the 
metropolitan regions in terms of revenue sharing: the central 
city the Tokyo ku area, has less per capita revenue than its 
-
surrounding cities, (as shown by Gencer and Glickman) and the SCA 
as a whole has a remarkably low per capita revenue when compared 
9 to the other SCAs . Since the Tokyo region is relatively older 
and more developed, the metropolitan decentralization process 
has set in (like in U.S. metropolitan areas) while the other 
metropolies showed less decentralization (this has been shown by 
Glicknan [1377bI); political considerations (i.e. socialist 
local government in Tokyo facing a conservative LDP central 
government) may be another possible cause for the lower per 
capita revenues. The difference between the Tokyo SCA and the 
other SCAs is also observable when the changes in percent shares 
are considered in Table 5. While all SCAs have declining 
shares in the 1365-1970 period, the ~okyo SCA increases its share 
in both periods. 
'~ote that Table 5 gives data for the total share of revenues. 
If these data are calculated on a per capita basis, Tokyo's share 
is low. 
Table 5: Percent Share of National Total 
Revenues for SCAs, 1960-1970 
Sendai 
Tokyo 
Kanazawa 
Nagoya 
Osaka 
Okayama 
Fukuoka 
Matsuyama 
(percent) 
1960 
2.32 
23.28 
2.16 
10.69 
28.04 
1.74 
2.34 
1.33 
To get a more comprehensive idea of revenue sharing, we 
looked at the manner by which individual revenue items are distri- 
buted. However, we wanted to analyze their distribution to cities 
in relative terms. Here we made use of the "share quotient," a 
measure which expresses the relative advantage of a city in 
receiving a specific type of revenue. 
First we examine local taxes. In this category there is 
great uniformity in the relative ability of cities to raise 
10. 
local taxes as most of the indices are close to 1.0. This is 
consistent with our expectations because local taxes are regulated 
by Diet laws and standards. Levying a local tax higher than 
the national standard rates requires special action from the 
central government. 
We consider local bonds in Figure 5 where share quotients 
for 1965 are mapped. We discern three patterns by examining 
share quotients for local bonds in all three points in time. 
First, almost all metropolitan cities outside of the SCAs have 
indices of 1.05 or greater. That is, their revenue sharing 
relies heavily on local bonds (which are purchased by the CG). 
As a matter of fact, the Ministry of Home Affairs allows New Indus- 
trial Cities to issue local bonds at higher than standard levels. 
Since some of the non-SCA cities in our data set are designated 
industrial and growth areas, we find them issuing relatively 
more bonds. Second, in the highly developed municipalities within 
the Tokyo, Nagoya, and Fukuoka SCAS, relatively small amounts of 
local bonds were issued. 
'O~his is also consistent without regression analyses of 
local taxes where the variables relating to the size of the city 
and its economic activities explain the variations in local taxes 
at a magnitude of R~ = 0.97, as noted in Section 4.3.3 below. 
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The third revenue item which we explored is treasury dis- 
bursements. As we discussed in Section 3.1, they are earmarked 
by the central government for specific projects. The share 
quotients for treasury disbursements for 1965 is given in Figure 
6. The share quotients for treasury disbursements shows a chang- 
ing pattern between the year 1960 and the two years 1965 and 
1970: a shift from a priority for subsidizing already-developed 
cities in 1360 to one favoring the development of urban areas 
in less developed regions in 1965-1970. This change in the 
priority of distributing treasury disbursements, of course is 
consistent with the change in national policies towards promoting 
national economic growth through developing the lagging regions. 
This is being discussed by Glickman [1977c] and the Japan Plinistry 
of Home Affairs [1969$. 
Finally, let us look at the share pattern for the nonearmarked 
revenues which we have depicted in Figure 7. The distribution of 
NEMR revenues is relatively simple to interpret if we recall that 
a city's Local Allocation Tax (the largest component of NEMR) is 
computed by the CG as the difference between the former's standard 
financial needs and standard revenues. In general, three elerr-ents 
Seem to affect the priority given to a city 'in receiving NEMR 
revenues: first, the national and/or regional growth policies 
for urban areas (which roughly determine the magnitude of neces- 
sary expenditures); second, the ability of the locality to issue 
local bonds; and third, the proportion local needs met by treasury 
allocations. In other words, in cities designated for growth and 
development by national policies (even though such areas have 
priority in receiving treasury disbursements and in issuing local 
Figure 6: Share Quotient for Treasury 
/ Disbursements, 1965. 
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bonds) NEMR share quotients are hisher than the average. Cases in 
point are cities in the Kyushu and the Hokkaido regions. In such 
areas NEM revenues should have high positive correlations with both 
local bonds and treasury disbursements. A positive correlation 
between treasury disbursements and NEM revenues can also be observed 
in well-developed urban areas, such as the metropolitan regions of 
Tokyo, Nagoya and Osaka, where both revenue types have low scores. 
These were growth areas both in terms of ~opulation and economic 
activities during the 1960s and they had less priority for 
treasury disbursements and less need for NEM revenues. In 
Fukuoka and the Tohoku region in general, however, a negative 
relation holds between these two types of revenues. While 
these areas had low priority for treasury disbursements, they 
received higher NEM revenues to meet their financial needs 
because they were slow-growing. 
4 . 3 . 2 . 3  Changes in the Spatial Patterns of Revenue 
Sharing 
In this section we describe general changes in revenue 
sharing and then proceed to offer some detail, particularly to 
observe these changes in spatial terms. 
We first compare percent changes in total revenues and 
percent changes in per capita total revenues (see Figure 8 
and 9). In general, there is a high correlation between the 
two measures of total revenue changes. The corollary to this 
observation, then, is that there is a positive correlation 
between changes in population and changes in revenues. In fact, 
F i g u r e  8 :  P e r c e n t  Change i n  P e r  
C a p i t a  T o t a l  Revenues,  
1 9 6 5 - 1 9 7 0 .  
19. KUMAGAYA 
20. CHlBA 
21. TOKYO 
22. YOKOHAMA 
23. HIRATSUKA 
24. ODAWARA 
25. NllGATA 
26. NAGAOKA 
27. TOYAMA 
28. TAKAOKA 
29. KANAZAWA 
30. FUKUl 
31. KOFU 
32. NAGANO 
33. MATSUMOTO 
34. GlFU 
35. SHIZUOKA 
36. HAMAMATSU 
37. NUMAZU 
38 NAGOYA 
39. TOYOHASHI 
40. TOYOTA 
41. TSU 
42. YOKKAlCHl 
43. ISE 
44. OTSU 
45. KYOTO 
46. OSAKA 
47 KOBE 
48 HGJI 
49. NARA 
50. WAKAYAMA 
51. TOTTORI 
52. YONAGO 
53. MATSUE 
54. OKAYAMA 
55. KURASHlKl 
56. HIROSHIMA 
57, FUKUYAMA 
58 SHlMONOSEKl 
59. UBE 
60 YAMAGUCHl 
61. IWAKUNI 
62. TOKUSHIMA 
63. TAKAMATSU 
64. MATSUYAMA 
65, IMABARI 
66. NllHAMA 
67. KOCHl 
d. KITAKYUSHU 
69. FUKUOKA 
70. OMUTA 
71 KURUME 
72 SAGA 
73. NAGASAKI 
74. SASE80 
75. KUMAMOTO 
76. YATSUSHIRO 
77. OlTA 
78. MlYAZAKl  
79 NOBEOKA 
80 KAGOSHIMA 
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R e v e n u e s ,  1 9 6 5 - 1 5 7 0 .  
125.1 to  200.0 - # # -  
100.1 t o  125.0 -"- 
25.1 t o  100.0 -.- 
41. TSU 
42. YOKKAlCHl 
43. ISE 
44. OTSU 
45. KYOTO 
46. OSAKA 
47. KOBE 
48. HlMEJl 
49. NARA 
50. WAKAYAMA 
51. TOTTORI 
52. YONAGO 
53. MATSUE 
54 OKAYAMA 
55. KURASHlKl 
16. MAEBASHI 56. HIROSHIMA 
17. TAKASAKI 57. FUKUYAMA 
18. KlRYU 58. SHlMONOSEKl 
19. KUMAGAYA 59. UBE 
20. CHlBA M). YAMAGUCHI 
21. TOKYO 61, IWAKUNI 
22. YOKOHAMA 62. TOKUSHIMA 
23. HIRATSUKA 63. TAKAMATSU 
24. ODAWARA M. MATSUYAMA 
25. NllGATA 65. IMABARI 
1. SAPPORO 26. NAGAOKA 66. NllHAMA 
2. HAKODATE 27. TOYAMA 67. KOCHl 
3. MURORAN 28. TAKAOKA 68. KITAKYUSHU 
4. KUSHIRO 29. KANAZAWA 69. FUKUOKA 
5. MORIOKA 30. FUKUI 70. OMUTA 
'G.,? fk- m' 6. SENDAI 31. KOFU 71. KURUME 7:: . 7. ISHIMAKI n. NAGANO 72. SAGA 8. AKlTA 33. MATSUMOTO 73. NAGASAKI 9. YAMAGATA 34. GlFU 74. SASEBO 
-- ,iJp - ., i 10. FUKUSHIMA 35. SHIZUOKA 75. KUMAMOTO 11. AIZUWAKAMATSU 36. HAMAMATSU 76. YATSUSHIRO 
b., 12. KORIYAMA 37. NUMAZU 77. OlTA 
. 80. 13. MlTO 38. NAGOYA 78. MlYAZAKl 
, . ' \  T "  14. HlTACHl 39. TOYOHASHI 79. NOBEOKA 
% -,- -,. \ ,/* 15. UTSUNOMIYA 40. TOYOTA 80 KAGOSHIMA 
c. 
population becomes one of the major independent variables in 
forecasting the reverlues in our reqression analyses reported in 
Section 4.3.3 below. 
We also offer several observations about percent changes 
of both per capita revenues and absolute revenues. 
Increases in both absolute and per capita revenues were 
substantial, averaging about 100-150 percent, for the 1960-1965 
and 1965-1970 time periods. " This reflects the growth of the 
Japanese economy (as noted in Glickman [1977c]) and the fact that 
expenditures (both in absolute and per capita terms) were increas- 
ing in urban areas. This can be attributed to somewhat more em- 
phasis on social welfare and to coping with problems arising 
from congestion and high density development in urban areas. As 
the GNP per person rose, public spending could be afforded more 
easily. 
In the first period, changes in local bonds were highly 
skewed: there were increases of more than 500 percent for twenty- 
three of the eighty cities, while nine cities declined. A simi- 
lar picture, although with smaller magnitudes,. holds for treasury 
disbursements. Also, during the first period, total local bonds 
and total treasury disbursements are higher than those in the 
latter period. These changes can be interpreted as responses to 
smaller increases in the local taxes in the first period. First, 
the larger amounts of local bonds and treasury disbursements were 
allocated by the CG to compensate for the lower- than-expected 
levels of locally-raised revenues and non-earmarked revenues; 
we discuss this in the following paragraph. Second, the rather 
1 1  
II During the first period, local taxes increased more in 
. SCAs than in the non-SCA cities, reflecting greater SCA economic 
growth. In the second period, both non-SCA cities and SCAs had 
large increases. The total local tax increase in the first 
period was much smaller than that in the period of 1965-1970. 
uneven distribution observed for local bonds and treasury disburse- 
ments in the first period can be explained as increasing the 
revenue levels of those cities involved in special development 
programs. 
Regarding NEMR, the 1960-1965 period witnessed a general 
fall in the amount of per capita NEMR distributed. Conservative 
policies of the Ministry of Finance in setting tax policy led to 
a relatively small volume of national taxes collected; this, in 
turn, contracted the size of NEMR that was allocated. Again, 
in the first period, the distribution was highly skewed. The 
cut-backs fell upon suburban cities of the SCAs and fast-growing 
non-SCA cities on Honshu. Great increases, on the other hand, 
were seen in the SCAs' central cities and in regions designated 
for development. 
The second period 11965-1970) showed a less skewed distribu- 
tion. Actually, one can compare 1960 and 1970 total revenue 
shares and observe the striking correspondence between them,while 
the 1965 shares were different. However, one cannot establish 
whether the 1960 distribution was more equitable than that of 
1965. Descriptively, we see that the polarization observed in per- 
cent change during the period 1960-1965 did not continue into thc 
second period. Local taxes showed uniform increases for all cities, 
and the total increases were hlgher than the first period. Local 
bonds, however, showed a decline in the rate of increase in the 
second period: nine cities show negative changes. Treasury dis- 
bursements also displayed a smaller increase, and the peaks and 
troughs of the early period were smoothed out. NEM revenues, 
on the other hand, more than doubled for 65 of the 80 cities. 
Next, we observe the shift indices to trace the patterns of 
change. The shift indices confirm the interpretations made 
above (see Figures 10 and 11 for the maps of shift indices for 
the two time periods). Given the percent change trends as 
described in the preceding paragraphs, we can look at the shifts 
in shares of cities in the national total. The 1960-1965 shift 
scores for local taxes for many cities are quite low. The areas 
that did badly were non-SCA cities in less developed regions, and 
the metropolitan centers (except for Tokyo and Sendai). The same 
situation that produced low local taxes also underlined the 
relatively small amounts of NEM revenues that were distributed 
during the first period. 
To offset these declines, two mechanisms were employed by 
the CG: local bond purchasing and treasury disbursements. The 
shift analysis (see Gencer and Glickman [Appendix IV, Table IVI) 
indicates large increases in local bonds and treasury disburse- 
ments for certain urban areas with heavy losses forothers. 
First, there was the redistribution from urban areas in the 
SCAs and old urban areas on Honshu to non-SCA cities in develop- 
ing regions. Second, there was a shift from suburban to central 
cities within the SCAs. The reasons are that SCA metropolitan ten- 
ters (and some non-SCA cities) had low levels of local tax revenues, 
and cities in designated development areas were consciously being 
subsidized by the CG. In both cases, local taxes fell short of 
expected expenditures. Even though NEll revenues were limited, 
their distribution foilowed a similar pattern to that of local 
bonds and treasury disbursements. That is, the reductions occurred 
in urban areas on Honshu while the increases were observed in SCA 
F i g u r e  10 :  S h i f t  I n d i c e s  f o r  T o t a l  
Revenues ,  1960-1965. 
41. TSU 
42. YOKKAlCHl 
43. ISE 
44. OTSU 
45. KYOTO 
46. OSAKA 
47. KOBE 
48. HlMEJl 
49. NARA 
50. WAKAYAMA 
51. TOTTORI 
52. YONAGO 
53. MATSUE 
54. OKAYAMA 
55. KURASHlKl 
56. HIROSHIMA 
57. FUKUYAMA 
58. SHlMONOSEKl 
59. UBE 
60. YAMAGUCHI 
61. IWAKUNI 
62. TOKUSHIMA 
63. TAKAMATSU 
64. MATSUYAMA 
65. IMABARI 67, KdCHi.... 
68. KITAKYUSHU 
69. FUKUOKA 
70. OMUTA 
71. KURUME 
72. SAGA 
73. NAGASAKI 
74. SASEBO 
75. KUMAMOTO 
76. YATSUSHIRO 
77. OlTA 
78. MlYAZAKl 
79 NOBEOKA 
80. KAGOSHIMA 
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16. MAEBASHI 
17. TAKASAKI 
18. KlRYU 
19. KUMAGAYA 
28. TAKAOKA 
19. KANAZAWA 
30. FUKUl 
31. KOFU 
32. NAGANO 
37. NUMAZU 
38. NAGOYA 
39 TOYOHASHI 
40 TOYOTA 
41. TSU 
42. YOKKAlCHl 
43. ISE 
44. OTSU 
45. KYOTO 
46. OSAKA 
47. KOBE 
48. HlMEJl 
49. NARA 
50. WAKAYAMA 
51. TOTTORI 
53 MATSUE 
54 OKAYAMA 
55. KURASHlKl 
56. HIROSHIMA 
57. FUKUYAMA 
58. SHlMONOSEKl 
59. UBE 
60. YAMAGUCHI 
61. IWAKUN~ 
62. TOKUSHIMA 
63. TAKAMATSU 
64 MATSUYAMA 
65. IMABARI 
66. NllHAMA 
67 KOCHl 
68. KITAKYUSHU 
72. SAGA 
73. NAGASAKI 
77. OlTA 
metropolitan centers as well as the Fyushu and Hokkaido regions. 
~espite the efforts by CG to offset the relative decrease in 
local taxes in older and well-developed urbar~ areas, metropolitan 
regions (sCAS) lost some of their share to non-SCA cities, especial- 
ly to those in Kyushu and Hokkaido. Between 1965 and 1970, however, 
we see a reversal of the situation. Local taxes and NEM revenues, 
at the national level, increased as the Japanese economy grew more 
rapidly. As these revenues increased, fewer local bonds were pur- 
chased; this is particularly true in the Kyushu and Chugoku,regions 
where cities were more likely to be financed through treasury dis- 
bursements and prefectural disbursements. Those areas which were 
supported by local bonds were the SCAs so that they could reattain 
their 1960 levels in their share of the national revenues. 
Overall, the second period is governed by two tendencies. 
First, regional development, particularly for Kyushu and Hokkaido 
regions, and second, increasing SCA cities to their 1960 shares. 
~ 0 t h  of these tendencies were helped by the increase in local taxes 
and an enormous increment in NErl revenues zaupled with a steady and 
uniform increase in treasury disbursements. 
4.3.3 Multilinear Regression Analysis of the Large Cities 
4.3.3.1 Introduction 
In this section we summarize the multilinear regression 
analysis undertaken to further the understa.nding of the spatial 
distribution of revenues and changes in this distributionover 
time. Here we try to associate local revenues with social, 
economic, and political aspects of urban areas. -We have five 
regression equations, each corresponding to one of the five 
revenue types. l2 The dependent variables are the revenue catagories 
and the independent variables are the same as used in the previous 
regressions (see Table 3 for variable definitions). 13 In the re- 
gressions, summarized in Section 4.3.3.2 through 4.3.3.6, each 
independent variable and the R~ is significant at a 95 percent 
confidence level. 
4.3.3.2 Local Bonds 
The regression equations for local bonds in the two time 
periods are: 
LB = - 371.700 + 0.05 SALES + l46'.50 INFRA - 1028.30 LPDV 
(1 965) 
+ 248.50 SPDIST + 5.34 CTYAGE 
R2 = C.80 
LB = - 3086.10 + 0.12 SALES + 346.90 INFRA - 1798.10 LPDV 
(1 970) 
+ 10.22.20 SPDIST + 2313.80 ATEMP (2) 
R2 = 0.93 
Clearly, the equations do not change significantly between periods. 
Two points can be made about Equations (.I) and (2). First, in both 
periods, the variables in Appendix 2's Group I (SALES, INFRA, and 
LDPV) account for most.of the explained variance with expected 
1 2 ~ o  repeat, these are Local bonds, Local taxes, Treasury 
disbursements, Non-earmarked revenues, and prefectural disbursements. 
13~ppendix 2 examines the interrelationships among the 
independent variables. This was necessitated by the high 
multi-collinearities observed among the variables. Keeping in 
mind the interrelationships among the independent variables that 
are explained in Appendix 2 will be helpful in analyzing the 
results of the regressions in the discussion below. In Appendix 
2 we show certain groups of interrelated variables which we refer 
to in the body of the text in Section 4.3.3.2 to 4.3.3.6. 
signs. This suggests that revenues from local bonds are higher 
in big metropolitan centers. Also, the remaining variance 
in the dependent variables is explained by variables relating to 
designated growth areas. SPDST is a dummy variable showing either 
a New Industrial City or Special Area (both of which are designated 
under regional development programs). Note the large change in 
the coefficient attached to SPDIST, from 248.5 to 1022.2 indicat- 
ing the increasing importance of the governments regional develop- 
ment programs in the late 1960s. The positive sign on CTYAGE 
(which shows how recently the city was constituted) also conform 
with this assertion. In the second period, the positive sign on 
GTEMP also indicates that a portion of local bonds go to cities 
which were growing quickly in the 1965-1970 period. These two 
inferences are consistent with our descriptive analysis of 
Section 4.3.2 where we observed that the revenues from local bonds 
were relatively higher in the non-SCA cities of Kyushu, Hokkaido, 
and Chigoku major regions,.in fast-growing metropolitan centers 
in 1965, and in all metropolitan centers in 1970. 
4.3.3.3 Local Taxes 
The regression equations for local taxes are as follows: 
LTX = 14519.00 + 0.20 SALES + 880.80 INFRA - 19423.00 ADULT 
(1965) 
+ 39556.00 COLGE - 9.10 INMGR + 7866.00 REMP + 79.90 MFPRD 
LTX = 33415.00 + 0.07 SALES + 358.30 INFRA - L12909.00 ADULT 
(1970) 
- 2624.00 DEPR + 2.20 INMGR + 1498.00 REPIP + 96.10 MFPRD 
2 R = 0.99 (4 
The basic change between the two years is the change of sign and 
explanatory power of INMGR. But this is expected because we have 
seen that INMGR enters into Group I of the independent variables, 
those variables relating to general economic activity. As with the 
local bonds equations, the major part of the explanation is given 
by Group I variables (SALES, INFRA, and INMGR in 1970). This is 
so since larger metropolitan areas (with high population and labor 
force levels, large local markets and well-developed public faci- 
lities) were able to levy a multiplicity of local taxes and in- 
creases their tax base. It is also interesting to see the positive 
relationship of Group IV variables (REMP in 1965 and FIFPRD) to LTX. 
This suggests that cities with heavy concentrations of secondary 
industrial production with high value added per worker raise more 
local taxes. It has been suggested that such cities are small, 
with flat income distributions (due to the occupation structures 
of such cities, i.e. heavy concentration in blue collar jobs), 
so that the income tax revenues are high. The negative sign on 
ADULT, which seems contradictory at first glance can be explained 
by the fact that smaller cities that are slow-growing tended to 
have older work forces. Such economically stagnant areas also 
were less capable of raising local taxes; these cities are found 
in underdeveloped regions of Japan. The positive sign on COLGE 
is something we expected and the minus sign on DEPR indicates 
that the higher the dependency rate of population on the employed 
labor force, the less revenue from local taxes. This, too, is 
plausible on - a priori grounds. 
4.3.3.4 Treasury Disbursements 
We have estimated the following equations: 
TRD = - 9999.00 +.0Y SALES + 0.33 POP -+ 5054.08 DEPR + 28967 .00  ADULT 
(1965) 
- 37610.00 COLGE - 53.40 PlFPRE ( 5  
R~ = 0.83 
TRD = - 2509.00 + 0.19 SALES + 632.20 INFRA - 3286.00 LDPV + 
(1970) 
+ 2715.00 DEPR - 8.00 INC + 633.90 SPDIST + 2569.00 A TEMP (6) 
Here, the Group I variables (i. e. , SALES, POP, LDPV, INFRA) 
explain most of the variation in 1970 while their contribution in 
1965 is less important. In the 1965 period, treasury disbursements 
vary positively with Group I and negatively with Group I1 variables. 
The first group indicates that TRD was higher in cities with 
high population and volume of market transactions; the second 
component suggests lower TRD allocations in urban areas where 
the population was highly educated and where there was a high ratio 
value added to employment in the secondary sector. The latter two 
inverse relations suggest that growing, high production urban areas 
and big metropolitan centers received less TRD. These interpreta- 
tions are consistent with the analysis of the previous section 
where we found that in the first period, metropolitan areas and 
non-SCA cities of lesser-developed regions on the one hand, and 
Northern Honshu metropolitan areas on the other, had priority in 
receiving TRD. 
Z In 1970, Group I variables dominate and the R of the re- 
gression increases as well. However, the negative relation 
to INC and positive relation to SPDIST and ATEMP are consistent 
with the continuing national policy of stimulating and sustain- 
ing growth in lesser developed regions of Japan. Thus cities 
with lower average incomes received more treasury disbursements. 
We reinforce this conclusion in Section 5.2. 
4.3.3.5 Non-earmarked Revenues 
This set of regressions yielded quite different regression 
equations from those of the three preceding revenue types: 
NEMR = - 1808.00 - 0.04 SALES + 0.21 POP + 992.00 DEPR - 6588.00 COLGE 
(1965) 
+ 3.10 CTYAGE - 24.70 MFPRD 
NEMR = - 5224.00 - 0.04 SALES + 0.33 POP + 506.00 INFRA + 3146.00 DEPR 
(1970) 
+ 15963.00 COLGE - 5.31 INC - 2450 REMP + 2759.00 ASECE 
First we observe the inconsistency between the signs of SALES 
and POP (and INFRA in 1970) and those of REMP and ASECE.in 1970. 
In both cases, one would expect the signs to be the same because 
the simple correlation coe,fficients (with regard to MEMR) in each 
group are positive and greater than 0.75. However, it must be 
remembered that N M R  is calculated as a residual of the estimated 
financial needs after the estimated of local taxes are subtracted. 
Also, the financial need of a LG is very sensitive to national or 
iocal public projects that the LG must participate in financially. 
Therefore, in cities located in designated development regions, 
the tax base could be high, a large amount of TRD could be received 
and LB floated, but still a substantial residual couId remain due 
to national growth policies and their consequent financial resource 
demands. 
NEMR, increases its correlation with LB and LTX from first 
period to the second; it, therefore, can be better explained by 
the attributes of the urban areas. This is reflected in the higher 
2 
R of the latter time period. 
4.3.3.6 Prefectural Disbursements 
We have the following regression equations: 
PRD = - 161.00 + 0.01 SALES + 33.10 INFRA + 194.80 REMP 
PRD = - 2547.00 + 0.38 POP - 110.90 INFRA - 0.18 INMGR t 4689.00 ADULT 
(1970) 
- 5401.00 COLGE + 0.97 INC - 611.70 ATEMP 
The equation for 1960-1965 is dominated by INFRA and SALES. 
REMP is also positively related, though not as strongly. In this 
period, there was a relatively small amount of PRD to be distribu- 
ted and most RECs received very little from this source; however, 
cities in the metropolitan regions of Tokyo, Kanazawa, Osaka, and 
Nagoya were exceptions, i.e. they received a substantial amount of 
PRD. Thus, we have the dominance of S.3LES and INFRA. 
The distribution of PRD changed significantly by 1970. 
There was a much more uniform distribution with a larger amount 
of total PRD to be allocated. However, population size was still 
a significant determinant in the amount of PRD, as far as the 
cities in the developed regions are concerned. In the other 
regions (Kyushu, Hokkaido, Shikoku, and Tohoku), population is 
an important determining factor, but also industrial cities and 
New Industrial Cities where prefectural governments initiated 
public projects had greater shares of PRD. Thus, the negative 
signson INFRA, INMGR, and COLGE and the positive sign of POP and 
and INC can be attributed to the continuing PRD flow into 
metropolitan areas in the Tokaido region where both population 
and average family income are higher. 
5. FURTHER EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE ROLE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
RELATION IN REDUCING INTERREGIONAL INCOME INEQUALITY 
5.1 Introduction 
In Section 4, we presented analyses for data sets of large 
and small cities from our City Data Bank and indicated that re- 
distribution of government revenues from rich to poor cities was 
being carried out during the 1960s. Here, we give further evidence 
of this phenomenon, employing more aggregative data on a prefectural 
basis for 1970. 
5.2 Redistribution as Indicated by Prefectual Data 
Data from the Japan Bureau of Statistics Office of the 
Prime Minister, [I9731 for 1970 confirm our evaluation of the re- 
distribution mechanisms outlined in Section 4. First, in order 
to see the extent that prefectural goverfi~ents (hereafter, PGs) 
with below-average incomes receive more (or possibly less) revenue 
from the CG, we calculated the variable PTs, the percent of a pre- 
fectural government's total revenues accounted for by CG treasury 
disbursements. This variable should show us how these percentages 
vary across the 46 prefectures. l4 In Table 6, we see that PTS 
accounts for only 12.8 percent of Tokyo's total revenue in 1970, 
the lowest percentage of all prefectures. The highest percentage 
was in Kagoshima, 38.3 percent. 
How does PTS vary with the index of prefectural personal income 
(Y) which is also given in Table 6? We computed a regression relat- 
ing the two variables which yielded the following result: 
PTS = 61.01179 - 0.35039 Y 
(11.31575) 
R~ = 0744 F = 128.046 
140kinawa was not included. 
Table 6:  Intergovernmental Transfers as  seen from 
Prefectural  Data, 1970  
Hokkaido 
Aomor i 
I w a t e  
Miy a g i  
A k i t a  
Yamagata 
Fukushima 
I b a r a k i  
T o c h i g i  
Gumma 
Sa i tama  
Chiba 
Tokyo 
Kanagawa 
N i i g a t a  
Toy ama 
I sh ikawa  
Fukui  
Yamanashi 
Nagano 
Gif  u  
Shizuoka 
A i c h i  
M i e  
S h i g a  
Kyoto 
Osaka 
HY090 
Nara 
Wakayama 
T o t t o r i  
Shimane 
Okayama 
Hiroshima 
Y amaguchi 
Tokushima 
Kagawa 
Ehime 
Kochi 
Fukuoka 
Saga 
Nagasaki  
Kumamoto 
O i t a  
Miyasaki  
Kagoshima 
T r e a s u r y  and Pre -  
f e c t u r a l  Disburse -  
ments  a s  a  P e r c e n t  
o f  C i t i e s '  T o t a l  
: ~ e v e n u e  
(CTPS) 
22.9 
23.3 
21.7 
16.8 
17.8 
15.4 
17.0 
,13.8 
14.6 
14.4 
9.9 
12.2 
17.5 
12.5 
16.9 
16.6 
18.6 
15.2 
18.5 
15.4 
13.9 
12.6 
13.1 
17.2 
15.1 
17.7 
15.9 
15.4 
15.7 
18.8 
21.1 
17.7 
15.1 
17.3 
19.5 
18.6 
16.4 
20.4 
28.7 
25.2 
26.3 
27.5 
25.7 
24.5 
26 .O 
25.4 
T r a s u r y  D i s -  
bursements  
a P e r c e n t  o f  
P r e f e c t u r e s  ' 
T o t a l  Revenues 
(PTS) 
36.9 
35.2 
32.8 
28.3 
33.3 
34.7 
31.8 
25.2 
25.1 
26.2 
21.9 
26.4 
12.8 
15.5 
37.6 
32.0 
26.6 
29.5 
29.4 
31.5 
27.0 
25.7 
17.8 
28.3 
24.7 
21.7 
14.9 
23.2 
27.2 
29.4 
30.5 
32.6 
28.3 
27.9 
29.0 
31.1 
27.2 
30.2 
34.5 
31.9 
33.3 
34.0 
33.4 
34.7 
36.1 
38.3 
T r e a s u r y  and 
P r e f e c t u r a l  
Disbursements  
as. a P e r c e n t  
o f  C i t i e s '  
T o t a l  Revenues 
(DEP) 
79.3 
86.8 
80.1 
41.1 
54.2 
.46.3 
58.5 
35.4 
36.3 
39.9 
27.0 
28.7 
17.5 
25.7 
36.3 
40.2 
47.6 
39.4 
59.9 
44.3 
37.3 
28.2 
27.9 
46.3 
37.7 
46.7 
41 - 5  
42.1 
49.4 
43.1 
67.6 
60.3 
36.0 
36.8 
46.7 
63.4 
4.4 .4 
53.7 
Index  o f  P e r  
C a p i t a  P e r s o n a l  
Income 
(Japan=100.0)  
( Y )  
The figure in parenthesis below the segressicn coefficient is 
the "t" statistic which 1s significant at a 95 percent confidence 
interval and the F is the F-statistic which measures the goodness- 
of-fit of the regression. It is significant at a one percent 
confidence interval. Equation (11) shows that for every unit 
increase in income, there will be a 0.35 unit decrease in the 
proportion of total revenues of a PG received from the central 
government. This is also seen in Figure 12 where the two variables 
and the regression line are plotted. Figure 12 shows the strong 
negztive corel2tion between PTS and Y. Therefore, there is 
clearly redistribution of go~ernmer~t revenues between rich and 
poor prefectures through the central gov~rnment's allocations 
to prefectural governments. 
A second type of redistribution--the combined effects of 
CG and PG redistribution to cities--can be seen in Equations 
(12) and (13). We constructed two measures of the relationship 
between LGs and the hiqher governmental units. CTPS (Table 6) 
is the percent of the citieshevenues coming from combined pre- 
fectural and treasury disbursements; the lowest was in Saitama 
(9.9 percent) and the highest was Kochi (28.7 percent). Equation 
(12) relates CTPS to Y in an effort to see if the hypothesis 
that cities in poorer regions are subsidized through treasury 
and prefecture disbursements is confirmed: 
CTPS = 32.21341 - 0.15143 Y 
(3.64037) 
The negative sign attached to Y indicates that, this hypothesis 
is correct. The lower (higher) the prefectures income, the less 
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(more) i t s  c i t i e s  g e t  f rom t h e s e  r e v e n u e  s o u r c e s .  F i g u r e  1 3  
shows t h i s  g r a p h i c a l l y .  However, t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  is  much weaker  
t h a n  t h a t  g i v e n  i n  E q u a t i o n  ( 1 2 ) ,  as shown by t h e  lower  F- ,  and 
t - . s t a t i s t i c s  a l t h o u g h  b o t h  a r e  s t i l l  h i g h l y  s i g n i f i c a n t .  
I n  E q u a t i o n  ( 1 3 ) ,  we r e l a t e  p r e f e c t u r a l  income t o  a n o t h e r  
(and  r e l a t e d )  measu re  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  be tween  LGs and h i g h e r  
gove rnmen ta l  l e v e l s ,  what  w e  c a l l  t h e  "dependency r a t i o "  (DEP). 
DEP i s  t h e  r a t i o  o f  t h e  c i t i e s '  t r e a s u r y  and  p r e f e c t u r a l  d i s b u r s e -  
ments  t o  l o c a l  t a x e s ;  it measures  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which  LGs are 
"dependen t "  upon t h e  CG and t h e  PGs and  i s  a l s o  a gauge  o f  
l o c a l  * t a x  e f f o r t " .  E q u a t i o n  (13 )  is:  
DEP = 153.48419 - 1.12747 Y 
(4 .97705)  
R~ = 0 . 3 6 0  F = 24.771  
T h i s  a l s o  c o n f i r m s  o u r  g e n e r a l  a rgument  t h a t  p o o r e r  c i t i e s  a r e  
a i d e d  by  o t h e r  gove rnmen t s  s i n c e ,  a g a i n ,  t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t  i s  
n e g a t i v e  and s i g n i f i c a n t :  LCs i n  p o o r e r  p r e f e c t u r e s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
g e t  more exogenous ly-de te rmined  f u n d s  r e l a t i v e  t o  l o c a l l  
r a i s e d  r e v e n u e s  t h a n  LGs i n  r i c h e r  p r e f e c t u r e s .  T h i s  r e l a t i o n -  
s h i p  i s  a lso  shown i n  F i g u r e  1 4  where DEP and Y are graphed .  
One f i n a l  r e l a t i o n ,  g i v e n  i n  E q u a t i o n  ( 1 4 )  shows t h e  e x t e n t  
t o  which  p r e f e c t u r e s  " p a s s  t h r o u g h "  r e v e n u e s  r e c e i v e d  f rom t h e  
CG t o  LGs and  t o  some d e g r e e ,  t h e  j o i n t  e f f e c t s  o f  CG and PG 
e f f o r t s  t o w a r d s  c i t i e s ,  w i t h  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  be tween  DEP and PTS: 
DEP = -34.94318 + 3.15200 PTS 
2 R = 0.464 F = 38.147 
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Equation (14) and Figure 15 indicate that the relationship is 
strongly positive: the more a prefecture gets from the CG, the 
more it and the CG give to its cities. 
The results of Section 5,underline those of Sections 3. and 
4,as they indicate the redistributive nature of the Japanese 
urban public finance system in yet another way. We showed that 
(1) low-income prefectural governments got relatively more treasury 
disbursements and (2) cities in low-income prefectures got rela- 
tively more funds from the CG and their respective PGs (both Fn 
relation to total revenues and in relation to local taxes) than 
did cities in richer prefectures. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The major purpose of this paper was to investigate the trends 
and patterns of intergovernmentaljfiscal relations within the 
Japanese urban system. After undertaking a brief description of 
the system itself (Section 2.), we conducted our empirical analysis 
of fiscal relations among the levels of government for the 1960s 
(Section 4. and 5.). The empirical part of this study was largely 
done on a data base consisting of city-specific data. 
The major question posed in this study involved the degree 
to which vertical redistribution of financial revenues took place 
within the financial system and how this was related to the level 
of economic development in individual reqions. We have found that 
vertical equity was the stated goal of Japanese policy-makers 
and that to a degree, movements toward equity were achieved. Poorer 
regions were clearly seen to be benefitting from the tax and subsidy 
programs carried out during the 1960s, especially with respect to 
earmarked revenues. This was particularly true in the less develop- 
ded regions such as Kyushu, Shikoku and Hokkaido. Our less elaborate 
analysis of prefectural data (in Section 5.) confirms these findings. 
These patterns of fiscal behavior are important not only in 
isolation but in relation to the overall regional planning system 
which we have discussed in Glickman [1977c]. There we saw that 
even though the cental government planners who were involved in 
regional development efforts claimed to be redistributing resources 
and people away from the richer, more densely populated agglomera- 
tions, this was not the case. Central government investment remained 
highly concentrated in the Tokaido megalopolis until late 
in the 1960s. The governmental efforts to create New Industrial 
Cities and Special Areas as growth poles were not backed by 
sufficient public investment. Moreover, the plans lacked enforce- 
ment powers to encourage plants to located away from the metropoli- 
tan core. The redistribution of population and, to a lesser degree, I 
jobs which occurred in the late 1960s was seen to be more of a I 
result of market-oriented forces than of planning. The redistribu- 
tion of income from rich to poor regions was probably not a result 
fo~mal planning. 
However, this paper indicates that there were other forces 
at work in the attempt to redistribute income. The intergovernmental I 
fiscal system was responsible for some cf the decline in income 
disparities noted by !?era [I9761 and Sakashita [I9761 and reviewed 
in Glickman [1977c]. By reducing the relative tax burden of 
people in poorer regions and by making tax subsidies available 
to LGs in those regions, the income gap between rich and poor 
was somewhat reduced. Obviously, this program was not the only 
factor, as we have argued in Glickman [1977c], but it certainly 
made a contribution. 
Appendix 1 
L i s t  o f  Var iab les  i n  t h e  C i ty  Data Bank- 
F i l e  1 conta ins  t h e  fol lowing items: 
1. P r e f e c t u r a l  Government (Dumny) 5. Distance t o  t h e  Nearest  C i t y  
2. New I n d u s t r i a l  C i t y  (Dummy) 6 .  comprehensive Growth Index 
3.  Spec ia l  Area (Dummy) 7.  Comprehensive I n h a b i t a n t  Power Index 
4. Distance from Tokyo 8. Age of C i t y  (1968=1) 
Each of  t h e  remaining t h r e e  f i l e s  is  comprised of t h e  fol lowing d a t a :  
Index of F inanc i a l  Power 
C i t y  Planning Area 
Number of Terms of t h e  Major 's  
E l ec t i on  
Major' s A f f i l i a t i o n  (LDP=l) 
Japan Housing Corporat ion Uni t s  
Number of E l i g i b l e  Voters  
Number of Voters  
Number of  Voters  Obtained 
by LDP Candidates 
Demographic 
21. T o t a l  Populat ion 
22. Area 
23. Populat ion Growth Rate 
24. Number of  Persons per  Household 
25. Ordinary Household 
26. Age D i s t r i b u t i o n ,  pe rcen t  15-64 
27. Age D i s t r i b u t i o n ,  pe rcen t  65c 
28. Average Age of Res idents  
29. Education pe rcen t  completing 
primary school  
9. Telephones p e r  1.000 popula t ion  
10. Percent  of  Populat ion wi th  Water Supply 
11. Number o f  Books i n  L i b r a r i e s  
12. Ordinary Households Living i n  
Dwelling Houses 
13. Owned House 
14. Tatami p e r  Household Member 
15. D I D  ord inary  Households Living i n  
Dwelling Houses 
16. D I D  Owned House 
17. D I D  Tatami p e r  Household Member 
18. Owned Car 
19. New Housing, T o t a l  
20. New Housing, Owned House 
Immigration 
~ a t i o  f Daytime popula t ion  t o  Nighttime 
popula t ion  
~ a l e l ~ e m a l e  Rat io  
D I D  Populat ion ( n o t  ad jus t ed )  
D I D  Populat ion Growth Rate 
D I D  Area ( n o t  ad jus t ed )  
D I D  Populat ion Densi ty  ( n o t  ad jus t ed )  
D I D  Populat ion ( ad jus t ed )  
D I D  Ordinary Household ( n o t  ad jus t ed )  
30. Educat ion,  p e r c e n t  h igh  school  41. Ordinary Household ( a d j u s t e d )  
g r a d u a t e s  42. D I D  Ordinary Household ( a d j u s t e d )  
31. Educat ion,  p e r c e n t  c o l l e g e  43. Popu la t ion  o f  t h e  Neares t  C i t y  
g r a d u a t e s  ( a d j u s t e d )  
Family Income and Expendi tures  
44. Receipt  56. 
45. Income (monthly) 57. 
46. Wage and S a l a r i e s  58. 
47. Rece ip t  o t h e r  t h a n  Income 59. 
48. Car ry  over  from Prev ious  Month 60. 
49. Living Expendi tures  61. 
50. Food 62. 
51. Housing 63. 
52. Fuel  and L igh t  64. 
53. C lo th ing  65. 
54. Miscel laneous  66. 
55. T r a n s p o r t a t i o n  and Communication 67. 
P r i v a t e  T r a n s p o r t a t i o n  
Non-living Expendi ture  
Earned Income Tax 
Other t a x  
Savings  Flow 
Amount o f  Savings ( s tock)  
Yearly Income 
Wholesale S a l e s  
R e t a i l  S a l e s  
Bank Depos i t  
Bank Loans 
v a l u e  added by manufacturing 
Economy 
By m u n i c i p a l i t y ,  by p l a c e  o f  By Munic ipa l i ty ,  by p l a c e  o f  work 
r e s i d e n c e  
Percen t  whi te  c o l l a r  workers 89. 
Employment, A l l  I n d u s t r y  90. 
Employment, Primary I n d u s t r y  91. 
Employment, Secondary I n d a s t r y  92. 
Employment, Manufacturing 93. 
Employment, T e r t i a r y  I n d u s t r y  94. 
Employment, Wholesale and R e t a i l  95. 
Employment, ~ i n a n c e a n d  insuranceg6 .  
Employment, T r a n s p o r t a t i o n  and 97. 
Communication 98. 
Employment, S e r v i c e  99. 
Employment, Government 
100. 
T o t a l  l a b o r  f o r c e  
P a r t i c i p a t i o n  Rate 
Employment, T o t a l  
Employment, Primary 
Employment, Secondary and T e r t i a r y  
Employment, Mining 
Employment, Cons t ruc t ion  
Employment, Manufacturing 
Employment, Wholesale and R e t a i l  
Employment, Finance and Insurance  
Employment, T r a n s p o r t a t i o n  and ~ommunicat ion 
Eiployment, S e r v i c e  
By Densely Inhabited District 
Employment, All Industries 101. -Total labor force 
Employment, Primary Industry 102. Value Added per worker in Manu- 
f acturing 
Employment, Secandary Industry 
103. DID Employee Total 
Employment, Manufacturing 
104. DID Primary 
Employment, Tertiary Industry 
105. DID Secondary and Tertiary 
Employment, Wholesale and Retail 
106. DID Mining 
Employment, Finance and 
Insurance 107. DID Construction 
Employment, Transportation and 108. DID Manufacturing 
Communication 109. DID Wholesale and Retail 
Employment, Services 110. DID Finance and Insurance 
Employment, Government 111. DID Transportation and Communication 
112. DID Service 
Appendix 2 
I n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s  o f  t h e  Independent  V a r i a b l e s  Used i n  t h e  S tudy  
Most o f  t h e  independent  v a r i a b l e s  t h a t  w e r e  c o n s t r u c t e d  
f o r  t h i s  s t u d y  a r e  h i g h l y  c o r r e l a t e d .  Analyzing t h e s e  r e l a t i o n s  
w i l l  h e l p  unders tand ing  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  r e g r e s s i o n  a n a l y s i s .  
I n  T a b l e s  1  and 2 o f  t h i s  appendix ,  c o r r e l a t i o n  m a t r i c e s  o f  
t h e  independent  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  g iven ,  f o r  1965 and 1970, r e spec-  
t i v e l y .  An examinat ion  of t h e s e  m a t r i c e s  r e v e a l s  two p a t t e r n s :  
f i r s t ,  c e r t a i n  v a r i a b l e s  have v e r y  h i g h  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s  and,  
second,  t h a t  t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  change s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
from f i r s t  t i m e  p o i n t  t o  t h e  second f o r  c e r t a i n  sets o f  v a r i -  
a b l e s .  W e  sea rched  f o r  f a m i l i e s  o f  v a r i a b l e s  by u s i n g  t h e  l i n k -  
age  method of f a c t o r  a n a l y s i s  ( t h i s  i s  a  r a t h e r  approximate  
method, b u t  s u f f i c e s  when t h e  o b j e c t i v e  i s  s o l e l y  d e s c r i p t i o n s  
of  f a m i l i e s  of  f a c t o r s ) .  F i g u r e  1  o f  t h i s  appendix  c o n t a i n s  t h e  
g roup ings  of  t h e  v a r i a b l e s  bo th  f o r  1965 and 1970. 
I n  1965, t h e  o u t s t a n d i n g  f a r - i l y  o f  v a r i a b l e s  i s  Group I 
which c o n s i s t s  o f  ( a )  SALES: volume of  r e t a i l  and w h o l e s a l e  
s a l e s ,  ( b )  POP: p o p u l a t i o n ,  and (c)  INFRA: t h e  index  o f  
p h y s i c a l  and s o c i a l  i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l  development o f  t h e  urban 
a r e a .  The f o u r t h  member--the p e r c e n t  of  LDP v o t e s  (LDPV)--is 
n e g a t i v e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  o t h e r  v a r i a b l e s  i n  t h i s  group,  w h i l e  
t h e  f i r s t  t h r e e  a r e  h i g h l y  p o s i t i v e l y  r e l a t e d .  Group I1 d i s -  
p l a y s  h i g h  p o s i t i v e  r e l a t i o n s  among i t s  members a s  w e l l ,  a l l  
of  which a r e  r a t e -o f -change  v a r i a b l e s :  ( a )  t o t a l  employment 
( A  TEMP), ( b )  t o t a l  p o p u l a t i o n  ( A  POP), (c)  secondary  sector 
employment ( A  SECE) , and ( d )  s e r v i c e  sectors employment ( A  SRVE) . 
I n t e r e s t i n g l y ,  A TEMP p l a y s  t h e  c e n t r a l  ro le ,  t h a t  i s ,  t h e  o t h e r  
t h r e e  v a r i a b l e s  r e l a t e  t o  each  o t h e r  v i a  A TEMP r a t h e r  t h a n  
d i r e c t l y .  
The t h i r d  group r e l a t e s  ADULT ( p e r c e n t  of  p o p u l a t i o n  a t  
a d u l t  age )  p o s i t i v e l y  t o  COLGE ( p e r c e n t  of p o p u l a t i o n  w i t h  
c o l l e g e  d e g r e e s )  and I N C  (average  f a m i l y  income) w h i l e  n e g a t i v e l y  


t o  DEPR, which shows t h e  r a t i o  of p o p u l a t i o n  t o  t o t a l  employment 
(dependecy r a t i o )  . F i n a l l y ,  i n  t h e  f o u r t h  group,  w e  have CTYAGE 
( i n d e x  t h e  age  o f  t h e  c i t y )  and MFPRD (manufac tu r ing  v a l u e  added 
p e r  worker)  which a r e  r e l a t e d  p o s i t i v e l y ,  b u t  v e r y  weakly t o  
REMP ( t h e  r a t i o  of  t h e  employees i n  t h e  p r o d u c t i n g  s e c t o r s  t o  
t h a t  of s e r v i c e  s e c t o r s  o f  t h e  urban economy). 
These f o u r  g roups  have r e l a t i v e l y  low c o r r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  
each o t h e r ,  none o f  them exceed ing  r = . 2 5 .  T h i s  means good 
s t a t i s t i c a l  s e p a r a t i o n ,  a  sound b a s i s  f o r  any i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  t o  
fo l low.  The f i r s t  group o f  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  i n d i c a t o r s  o f  a  
m e t r o p o l i t a n  a r e a :  l a r g e  volume b u s i n e s s  t r a n s a c t i o n s ,  h igh  
p o p u l a t i o n ,  and a  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  developed p h y s i c a l  urban l a y o u t  
and s o c i a l  overhead c a p i t a l ;  t h e s e  a r e  t h i n g s  t h e  u r b a n i s t s  
would e x p e c t  t o  o c c u r  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  i n  b i g  m e t r o p o l i t a n  a r e a s .  
T h i s  h y p o t h e s i s  is f u r t h e r  s u p p o r t e d  by t h e  n e g a t i v e  r e l a t i o n  
o f  LDP v o t e s  t o  t h e  p r e c e e d i n g  t h r e e  v a r i a b l e s ,  t h a t  i s ,  LDP 
s u p p o r t  comes mos t ly  from s m a l l e r  urban a r e a s .  
The second f a m i l y  o f  v a r i a b l e s ,  i s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  urban 
a r e a s  e x p e r i e n c i n g  r a p i d  growth. Such a r e a s  would u s u a l l y  
b e  i n  t h e  newer m e t r o p o l i t a n  r e g i o n s ,  o r ,  i n  i n d i v i d u a l  RECs  
i n  r e g i o n s  d e s i g n a t e d  f o r  growth. Thus, t h e  Sendai  m e t r o p l i s  
h a s  v e r y  low r a t e s  of  change b u t  h i g h  s c o r e s  i n  Group I ,  w h i l e  
Osaka h a s  h i g h  r a t e s  o f  change a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  h igh  s c o r e s  i n  
Group I .  T h i s  example i l l u s t r a t e s  t h a t  t h e  r a t e  of  change o f  
employment and p o p u l a t i o n  does  n o t  c o r r e l a t e  w i t h  t h e  s i z e  and 
l e v e l s  o f  development of t h e  urban a r e a .  (The c o r r e l a t i o n  
c o e f f i c i e n t  between Group I and Group I1 i s ,  on t h e  a v e r a g e ,  0 . 1 1 . )  
The i n t e r n a l  r e l a t i o n s  among t h e  o t h e r  two f a m i l i e s  a r e  
n o t  a s  s t r o n g  and n o t  a s  i n t e r e s t i n g .  Group I11 s u g g e s t s  t h a t  
urban a r e a s  w i t h  h i g h  r a t i o s  o f  c o l l e g e  g r a d u a t e s  and workforce  
e a r n  more, which i s  n e i t h e r  a s t o n i s h i n g  n o r  v e r y  r e v e a l i n g .  
Group I V ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, shows t h a t  newer urban a r e a s  w i t h  
h i g h  manufac tu r ing  v a l u e  added p e r  worker  c o - v a r i e s  w i t h  a  h i g h e r  
r a t i o  of  secondary  t o  t o t a l  employment. However, t h i s  a s s e r t i o n  
shou ld  n o t  be  t a k e n  a s  a n y t h i n g  more t h a n  p l a u s i b l e  because  
t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  a r e  q u i t e  low i n  t h i s  group.  
Observ ing  F i g u r e  1 o f  Appendix 2,  w z  c a n  see whethe r  
any changes  h a v e  o c c u r r e d  i n  t h e s e  f a m i l i e s  o f  v a r i a b l e s  from 
1965 t o  1970. G e n e r a l l y ,  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  g r o u p s  d o e s  
n o t  change  g r e a t l y  b u t  some v a r i a b l e s  change  g r o u p s ,  and  some 
new ones  e n t e r .  The f i r s t  g roup  s t a y s  r e l a t i v e l y  c o n s t a n t ,  
e x c e p t  now a  new v a r i a b l e ,  IMMGR ( d a y t i m e / n i g h t t i m e /  p o p u l a t i o n ,  
showing t h e  r e l a t i v e  commuting f o r  work t o  t h e  c i t y ) ,  e s t a b l i s h e s  
a v e r y  s t r o n g  p o s i t i v e  r e l a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  f i r s t  t h r e e  v a r i a b l e s  
o f  t h e  group.  Group I1 g a i n s  a  new v a r i a b l e  a s  w e l l ,  REMP. 
However, t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  change i s  n o t  i n  t h i s  new a d d i t i o n  o f  
a m e m b e r ,  b u t  r a t h e r  t h a t  t h e  v a r i a b l e  A TEMP loses t h e  s i g n i -  
f i c a n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  o t h e r  change v a r i a b l e s  i n  t h e  g roup ,  t o  
be  r e p l a c e d  i n  t h i s  role by REMP. The t h i r d  g roup  r e d u c e s  t o  
ADULT and COLGE, t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  among which i n c r e a s e s  i n  1970. 
Group I V  i s  s t i l l  v e r y  l o o s e l y  bound, so much so t h a t  one  c a n n o t  
make much o f  t h e  new membership o f  I N C  i n t o  t h i s  g r o u p ,  w h i l e  
REMP d r o p s  o u t .  
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